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Capacity To Stand Trial: The Amnesic
Criminal Defendant
Commonwealth ex rel. Cummins v. Price1
State v. McClendon2
In Cummins, the appellant, defendant below, was indicted for the
murder of one Nancy Flowers, whom the police discovered in the
defendant's automobile, severely wounded. The defendant was standing
about 100 feet away, suffering from a head wound. Both the defendant
and his victim were hospitalized; Nancy Flowers died, and the defen-
dant was found to be suffering from retrograde amnesia, possibly
caused by his head wound. After his indictment 'but prior to trial, the
defendant petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that
he had suffered a permanent loss of memory of all events prior to,
at the time of, and subsequent to, his arrest, and that for him to stand
trial would "violate his constitutional rights."' He therefore asked that
his indictment be dismissed, or alternatively that his trial be continued
until such time as 'he should regain his memory. The trial court dis-
missed the petition, although it found as a matter of fact that the de-
fendant's alleged amnesia was genuine but that the evidence of its
1. 421 Pa. 396, 218 A.2d 758 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 869 (1966).
2. 101 Ariz. 285, 419 P.2d 69 (1966).
3. He did not specify which rights, but probably was referring to the right not
to be deprived of liberty without due process of law or to the right to counsel.
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permanence was inconclusive. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania affirmed. In doing so, it expressly disavowed, as overly broad,
statements in earlier decisions that amnesia is an affirmative defense
to a criminal charge.4 Noting that at no time since the inception
of the proceedings had the defendant asserted that he was insane,
the court held that the defendant was competent to stand trial under
both the common law 5 and statutory6 tests in force in Pennsylvania.
The court stated that:
* * ' [The defendant] is able to comprehend his position as
one accused of murder, is fully capable of understanding the gravity
of the criminal proceedings against him, and is as able to co-operate
with his counsel in making a rational defense as is any defendant
who alleges that at the time of the crime he was insane or very
intoxicated or completely drugged, or a defendant whose mind
allegedly went blank or who blacked out or who panicked and
contends or testifies that he does not remember anything.'
The court further reasoned that inasmuch as the defendant's amnesia
was allegedly permanent, granting a continuance of the proceedings
against him would in effect ". . . require Courts to hold that such
amnesia will permanently, completely, and absolutely negate all criminal
responsibility," would turn over the determination of criminal liability
to psychiatrists, and would ". . . greatly jeopardize the safety and
security of law-abiding citizens."'
The decision was rendered by a seven-member court, of which twojudges separately concurred in the result and two others dissented.
The latter were of the opinion that the court erred in not granting
"reasonable continuances" in the absence of a definitive determination
that the defendant's amnesia was permanent. Furthermore, reasoned
the dissenters, the constitutional right to counsel would be a sham if
4. 218 A.2d at 761. See Commonwealth v. Iacabino, 319 Pa. 65, 167 At. 823(1935); Commonwealth v. Myma, 278 Pa. 505, 123 At. 486 (1924) ; Commonwealth
v. Morrison, 266 Pa. 223, 109 Atl. 878 (1920); Commonwealth v. Dale, 264 Pa. 362,
107 Atl. 743 (1919).
5. "The test at common law and employed by the courts in determining the
mental capacity of a defendant to stand trial or to be sentenced or executed is not
the M'Naghten 'right or wrong' test but whether the defendant is able to comprehend
his position and make a rational defense." Commonwealth v. Novak, 395 Pa. 199,
205, 150 A.2d 102, 105 (1959).
6. Mental Health Act of 1951, 50 P.S. §§ 1071, 1222, 1072(11) (1954). This
act provides that:
Whenever any person charged with crime, upon production or appearancebefore the court, appears to be mentally ill or in need of care in a mental hospital,
the court shall designate a responsible person to apply for his commitment, or for
his commitment for observation, treatment and diagnosis, by order of such
court. ...
50 P.S. § 1222.
The act defines "mental illness" as:
... an illness which so lessens the capacity of a person to use his customary
self-control, judgment and discretion in the conduct of his affairs and social rela-
tions as to make it necessary or advisable for him to be under care ....
50 P.S. § 1072(11).
The court held this act inapplicable in the absence of a claim that the defendant was
mentally ill or in need of care in an institution.




the defense counsel could not prepare a proper defense because of
defendant's amnesia.
In the McClendon case, the defendant was convicted of second
degree murder on facts nearly identical to those in Cummins. The body
of the defendant's wife was discovered in the defendant's automobile
at the Grand Canyon; the defendant was lying on the ground nearby,
bleeding from a self-inflicted bullet wound in his head. Throughout
his trial, the defendant claimed to have no memory of events surround-
in- his wife's death. On appeal, he argued that his amnesia rendered
him unable to assist his counsel and that the trial court erred in failing
to grant a continuance. The Supreme Court of Arizona agreed with
the defendant and held that where a defendant's exact mental condition
is unknown, the trial court must grant time for a thorough examina-
tion. If it then appears that the defendant's memory could be regained
by a reasonable amount of treatment, a continuance of the trial should
be granted to permit such treatment.9 The court did not indicate what
would be the result should -the defendant's amnesia be found to be
permanent.
The problem confronting both courts has seldom been reviewed
at the appellate level. When it has, the courts have almost invariably
held against the amnesic defendant, frequently without due considera-
tion of whether the defendant would in fact be capable of adequately
defending himself or whether trying an amnesic defendant constitutes
a denial of due process of law or of the right to counsel.
Amnesia is the loss, either temporarily or permanently, of memory
of conscious experience.' ° It may be caused by a wide variety of condi-
tions, but among criminal defendants it most often results from alco-
holism, hysteria, epilepsy, and head injury." Alcohol is the most fre-
quent cause of amnesia among criminal defendants ;12 it may be partial
or complete, the severity of the amnesia being directly proportional to
the blood alcohol level.'" Hysterical amnesia, on the other hand, is
always temporary. Caused by the inability of the mind to endure
extreme emotional stress (such as that associated with the commission
of a serious crime), the loss of memory is cured in time by the subsidence
9. It is our belief it would be a reproach to justice if a man, while suffering
from a temporary amnesic condition which could be alleviated by a reasonable
amount of treatment, was compelled to go to trial at a time when he was not
sufficiently in possession of his memory to enable him to properly assist his
counsel. It would be a similar reproach if a man, while suffering from amnesia
of an uncertain type and extent, was compelled to go to trial when the possibility
existed that a further examination would reveal his condition to be temporary and
susceptible to treatment.
419 P.2d at 72. One should note, however, that the Arizona court did not cite any
authority in support of its reasoning.
10. Gray, Amnesia In Criminal Trials, 1 J. oP SOCIAL THERAPY 100 (1955).
11. In addition, amnesia may be caused by drug reaction, diabetes, malaria,
somnambulism, senility, and may be a by-product of certain mental disorders, such
as depression, paranoia, and, rarely, schizophrenia. Good general surveys of amnesia
as it relates to legal matters are found in Hopwood & Snell, Amnesia in Relation to
Crime, 79 J. op MENTAL SCIENCE 27 (1933) ; Parfitt & Gall, Psychogenic Amnesia:
The Refusal to Remember, 90 J. oF MENTAL SCIENCE 511 (1944).
12. Lennox, Amnesia, Real and Feigned, 99 AM. J. ov PSYCHIATRY 732, 733
(1943) (hereinafter cited as "Lennox").
13. Gray, supra note 10, at 101.
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of the emotional distress.14 Hysterical amnesia is the most common
form of amnesia and the most easily feigned. Its detection, however,
is possible through careful examination, hypnosis, and drugs.' 5  The
amnesia associated with epilepsy, more particularly psychomotor
epilepsy (a variety of epilepsy in which the victim may be unconscious
of his acts and yet capable of performing as an intelligent, normal
person), is permanent. 6 Events which occurred during the attack
are completely eradicated from the victim's memory, the limits of the
"blank spot" being sharply defined by the onset and termination of the
attack. Finally, a head injury sufficient to cause unconsiousness may
also result in retrograde amnesia "with loss of memory -for events
which preceded ,the injury, as well as for a considerable period after
consciousness is apparently regained."' 7
The status of the amnesic defendant under common law is unclear.
The early English courts were unwilling to force one "disabled by act
of God" to defend himself in a criminal proceeding." This repugnance
found expression in the principle that a defendant found to be insane
could neither plead nor be tried. The classic statement of 'this principle
is as follows:
* * . [I]f a man in his sound memory commits a capital
offense, and before arraignment for it he becomes mad, he ought
not to be arraigned -for it, because he is not able to plead to it
with that advice and caution as he ought. And if, after he has
pleaded, the prisoner becomes mad, 'he shall not be tried; for how
can he make 'his defense. If, after he .be tried and found guilty,
he loses his senses before judgment, judgment shall not be pro-
nounced; and if after judgment he becomes of non-insane memo-
ry, execution shall 'be stayed: for peradventure, says the 'humanity
of English law, had the prisoner 'been of sound memory, he might
have alleged something in stay of judgment or execution ......
14. Coburn & Fahr, Amnesia and the Law, 41 IOWA L. Rzv. 369, 370 (1956)
MACDONALD, PSYCHIATRY AND THE CRIMINAL 93 (1958).
15. Id. ch. 7. In fact, most feigned amnesia is detectable by a trained psychiatrist.
See Lennox at 741.
16. Lennox at 734; Coburn & Fahr, supra note 14, at 372.
17. Lennox at 732. An idea of the incidence of amnesia among criminal defendants
may be gained from an essay by the late Dr. Manfred Guttmacher, in which he
reports that among thirty-six consecutive defendants indicted for the murder of
family members whom he examined, eight suffered a complete loss of memory of the
crime and three a partial loss. Guttmacher, Criminal Responsibility in Certain Homi-
cide Cases Involving Family Members, in PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 73, 81, 83
(Hoch & Zubin ed. 1955).
18. See Ex parte Emery [1909] 2 K.B. 81. An early American expression of this
view is found in Jordan v. State, 124 Tenn. 81, 135 S.W. 327 (1911) :
It would be inhuman, and to a certain extent a denial of the right of trial
upon the merits, to require one who has been disabled by the act of God from
intelligently making his defense to plead or be tried for his life or liberty. There
may be circumstances in all cases of which the defendant alone has knowledge,
which may prove his innocence, the advantage of which, if insane to such an
extent that he did not appreciate the value of such facts, or the propriety of
communicating them to his counsel, he would be deprived.
See also In re Buchanan, 129 Cal. 330, 61 Pac. 1120 (1900) ; Commonwealth v. Braley,
1 Mass. 102 (1804); WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER As A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 429
(1954).
19. 4 BLAcKSTONE, COMMENTARIES § 24 (Lewis ed. 1898); 1 Hale's P.C. 34.
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In 1800 this principle was embodied in the Criminal Lunatics Act,2"
which provided that a defendant found to 'be insane .by a jury should
be detained in an institution until 'he should regain his sanity and
thus be able to stand trial. Standards by which the jury could judge
sanity under this act were detailed in Rex v. Pritchard,21 including
• . . whether [the defendant] is of sufficient intellect to comprehend
the course of the proceedings of the trial, 'so as to make a proper
defense . . .and to comprehend the details of the evidence." 2
The common law principles governing capacity to stand trial
are universally accepted by American courts23 and have been codified
or supplemented by statute in most American jurisdictions. 24 These
statutes, based upon the Criminal Lunatics Act of 1800, generally
embody a test of capacity similar to that put forth in Pritchard, but
establish as individual criteria that the defendant (1) be able to
understand the nature of the proceedings against him and (2) be able
to assist in his defense. It 'has been left to the courts, however, to give
substance to these 'broadly stated tests. The former criterion is not an
issue -in the amnesic defendant cases. However, with respect to the
latter test, there are no definitive judicial explanations of how to assess
a defendant's ability to assist in his own defense, but there are indica-
tions. The early American courts, like the English, seemed to empha-
size the ,role of sound memory.25 Thus in United States v. Chisolm,2"
an early leading case, the court stated:
... [The question is] whether the prisoner at this time is
possessed of sufficient mental power, and has such understanding
20. 39 & 40 Geo. 3 c.94 (1800), reprinted in 5 Halsbury's Statutes of England
(2d ed. 1948) 593. This statute states, in part, that:
: .. [I]f any person indicted for any offense shall be insane, and shall upon
arraignment be found so to be by a jury lawfully impanelled for that purpose, so
that such person cannot be tried upon such indictment, or if upon the trial of any
person so indicted such person shall appear . . . [to be] insane, it shall be lawful
for the court . . . to order such person to be kept in strict custody until his
Majesty's pleasure shall be known.
21. 7 Car. & P. 304, 173 Eng. Rep. 135 (1836). It should be noted that this case
became the definitive interpretation of the Criminal Lunatics Act even though the
defendant therein was not insane, but merely a deaf mute.
22. Ibid.
23. United States v. Chisolm, 149 Fed. 284 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1906); People v.
Perry, 14 Cal. App. 2d 387, 94 P.2d 559 (1939) ; Ex parte Wright, 74 Kan. 406, 89
Pac. 678 (1907) ; In re Buchanan, 129 Cal. 330, 61 Pac. 1120 (1900).
24. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1367 (West 1956); 38 ILL. ANN. STAT.§ 104-1 (1964); N.Y. CRIMINAL CODE § 658 (McKinney 1958). MD. CODE ANN.
art. 59, § 9 (1957), proscribes the trial of anyone ". . . of such incapacity as to
prevent such person from properly conducting his or her defense .. " The test of
incapacity, however, has been held to be the M'Naghten rule. See Rowe v. State,
234 Md. 295, 199 A.2d 785, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 924 (1964). See MODEL PENAL
CODE § 40.4 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962), comment at 194 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
25. An early California judge commented on the common law of capacity to
stand trial as follows:
In the absence of any sensible loss of memory or mental impairment of the
intellectual faculties a man was counted sane. If he could remember events and
could reason logically, he was not within the letter or the reason of the rule which
suspended proceedings against a madman or lunatic. (Emphasis supplied)
In re Buchanan, 129 Cal. 330, 61 Pac. 1120, 1121 (1900). There are indications, how-
ever, that this construction of the common law authorities may be incorrect. It
appears that the word "memory" as used by the early writers ". . . does not relate to
recollection, but to a state of mind." R. v. Podola [1959] 3 All E.R. 418, 431. See
United States v. Boylen, 41 F. Supp. 724 (D. Ore. 1941).
26. 149 Fed. 284 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1906).
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of his situation, such coherency of ideas, control of 'his mental
faculties, and the requisite power of memory, as will enable him
to testify in his own behalf, if 'he so desires, and otherwise to
properly and intelligently aid ,his counsel in making a rational
defense.27
The issue came before the United States Supreme Court in
Dusky v. United States.2s In this case, the defendant, a schizophrenic,
claimed inability to stand trial under the federal statutory standard.2 9
He denied all memory of events surrounding an alleged kidnapping
with which he was charged, but did not -rely on this point in bar of
trial. In reversing and remanding for a new competency hearing (and
new trial, should the defendant be found competent), the Court said:
... [I]t is not enough for [the judge] .. . to find that 'the
defendant [is] oriented to time and place and [has] some recol-
lection of events,' but . . . the 'test must be whether he has suf-
ficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable
degree of rational as well as factual understanding of the proceed-
ings against him.'3 0
The determination of a defendant's "sufficient present ability to consult
with his lawyer with a degree of rational understanding," was dis-
cussed in Swisher v. United States,"' a habeas corpus proceeding
brought by a schizophrenic soldier (of sound memory) convicted by a
Court-Martial. In determining his capacity to stand trial, the court,
quoting an earlier case, 32 adopted among others the following standards:
.. . [W]hen it is evidentially made -to appear in a -habeas
corpus proceeding by a person under arrest 'status, confined pur-
suant to Sections 4244-4246, Title 18, U.S.C.A.: . .. (6) that
he will be expected to tell the lawyer the circumstances, 'to the best
of his mental ability (whether colored or not by mental aberration)
the facts surrounding him at the time and place where the law
violation is alleged to have been committed . . . and (8) he has
memory sufficient to relate those things in his own personal
manner . . ."33
An earlier view, pre-dating Dusky, was expressed in Lyles v. United
States,3 4 an appeal by a sociopathic defendant from a conviction of
27. Id. at 285 (Emphasis supplied).
28. 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
29. 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1959)
Whenever after arrest and prior to the imposition of sentence . . . the
United States Attorney has reasonable cause to believe that a person charged
with an offense against the United States may be presently insane or otherwise
so mentally incompetent as to be unable to understand the proceedings against
him or properly to assist in his own defense, he shall file a motion for a judicial
determination of such competency of the accused. . ..
30. 362 U.S. at 402.
31. 237 F. Supp. 921 (W.D. Mo. 1965), aff'd, 354 F.2d 472 (8th Cir. 1966).
32. Wieter v. Settle, 193 F. Supp. 318 (W.D. Mo. 1961).
33. 237 F. Supp. at 935.
34. 245 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
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robbery and unauthorized use of an automobile. Affirming, the court
of appeals said that: " 'To assist in his defense' [per 18 U.S.C. Sec.
4244 (1959)] of course does not refer to legal questions involved but
to -such phases of a defense as a defendant usually assists in, such as
accounts of facts, names of witnesses, etc."' 35 In connection with these
cases -interpreting the federal statute, it should 'be noted that, as in
the early English authorities, reference is made to sound memory
as a factor to weigh -in -assessing the defendant's capacity to stand trial,
although in some of the decisions, such as Swisher, the element of faulty
memory was not actually present.
These references notwithstanding, and aside from the instant Arizona
case, no American or English court has ever held loss of memory
by itself, even when shown to be temporary, -sufficient reason to render
the defendant unable to stand trial, even under the "assist in his own
defense" standard.
Perhaps the greatest exponents of a "'hard line" on amnesia as an
incapacitating factor are the military courts, which have faced the
problem with relative frequency, yet have never held amnesia to bar
trial. Three basic reasons exist in support of this "hard" approach: (1)
suspicion that the defendant -may be feigning amnesia ;36 (2) a feeling
(especially in cases of alleged alcoholic or hysterical amnesia) that
the defendant 'has only himself to blame for his loss of memory ;31 and
(3) the judicial apprehension that to hold that amnesia protects the
defendant from trial "would be tantamount to a holding that amnesia
negated criminal responsibility as an original proposition.""8 In the
leading military case, United States v. Olvera,39 the defendant got into
a scuffle with another soldier and received several stab wounds and
possibly some 'blows to the head. The accused testified that he then
lost -his memory temporarily; when it returned, he found himself stand-
ing with a knife in his hand and the other soldier lying at 'his feet,
oozing blood. The defendant was convicted of aggravated assault and
appealed to the Court of Military Appeals, alleging error in the failure
of the court below to consider how his alleged amnesia might affect
criminal -responsibility. The Appeals Court held that amnesia whether
due to head injury, alcoholism, or hysteria in no way negated criminal
responsibility; the court then proceeded to dispose of the defendant's
subsidiary contention that his amnesia indicated an inability to co-
operate in his defense:
Concededly, such an accused is at some disadvantage - for
if innocent, he does not demonstrate that quality by testimony that
he 'blacked out' and does not remember. However, he is still quite
competent to assume the witness stand, and to assure the court
35. Id. at 730 (Emphasis supplied).
36. See United States v. Watson, N.C.M. 376, 18 C.M.R. 391 (1954).
37. See United States v. Watson, N.C.M. 376, 18 C.M.R. 391 (1954) (alcoholic
amnesia is "largely self-imposed") ; United States v. Lopez-Malave, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 341,
15 C.M.R. 341 (1954) (hysterical amnesia viewed as self-imposed; "... precipitated
by the desire to forget the horrid details of [defendant's] crime.").
38. United States v. Olvera, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 134, 142, 15 C.M.R. 134, 142 (1954).
39. 4 U.S.C.M.A. 134, 15 C.M.R. 134 (1954).
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that he does not remember - and he is certainly able to analyze
rationally the probabilities of his having committed the offense
in light of his own knowledge of his character and propensities.
If his amnesia be rooted in some fundamental mental disorder
existing at the date of the acts charged, he will also be able to
raise the possibility that he was not mentally responsible at the
time. This we conclude - after indulgence in a weighing process
- affords him sufficient protection.4 °
Soon thereafter, the same court decided the case of a defendant suffering
from a severe "psychoneurotic disorder" as well as amnesia.4' In
affirming the defendant's conviction of passing bad checks, the court
said: "the type of loss of memory which might in and of itself, raise a
doubt as to capacity, is a loss of memory as to basic matters of general
application, as the difference between truth and falsehood, between the
moral and the immoral, not the memory of particular events."42 Askew
of the "hard line" approach, the military courts have indicated that a
postponement might be granted where temporary amnesia is shown,
but have never had occasion to grant this relief.43
Non-military courts have not, in general, been sympathetic to
the lot of the amnesic defendant; his disadvantages have been recog-
nized, but seldom have been persuasive." There are, however, indica-
tions of a less doctrinaire, more protective approach toward the amnesic
defendant, an approach perhaps motivated by fears that to try an
amnesic defendant might, in fact, be a violation of due process of law.
Some courts have articulated the principle that the trial of a
defendant not mentally present violates due process of law.4 5 Thus, it
has been held that due process prohibits the trial of an insane de-
fendant, 46 a semi-conscious defendant, 47 or a defendant under the
influence of drugs48 on the ground that defendants thus incapacitated
40. 4 U.S.C.M.A. at 142, 15 C.M.R. at 142. (Dissenting judge noted the difficulty
imposed by the majority on a defendant charged with a crime involving a specific
intent, but also noted that genuine amnesia is "reasonable cause" for application for
a continuance, and nothing more.)
41. United States v. Watson, N.C.M. 376, 18 C.M.R. 391 (1954).
42. 18 C.M.R. at 401.
43. United States v. Lopez-Malave, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 341, 15 C.M.R. 341 (1954);
United States v. Olvera, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 134, 15 C.M.R. 134 (1954). See United
States v. Beddingfield, A.C.M. 12692, 22 C.M.R. 840 (1956) (in which an amnesic
was held properly brought to trial where it was shown that he had the ability to
co-operate rationally in his defense, that there was no competent medical testimony
that the amnesia was other than permanent, and that there had been no request for
a continuance).
44. See State v. Severns, 184 Kan. 213, 336 P.2d 447 (1959), where the amnesic
defendant was held competent to stand trial. However, his alleged amnesia did not
arise until after the first, but prior to the second trial. Since the defendant testified
extensively at the first trial, the transcript could be introduced to provide the defen-
dant's testimony. State v. Swails, 223 La. 751, 66 So. 2d 796 (1953) (when a defen-
dant pleads insanity, his present amnesia is not a factor which prevents his assisting
counsel in that defense).
45. See Moss v. Hunter, 167 F.2d 683 (10th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 334 U.S.
860 (1948) ; Ashley v. Pescor, 147 F.2d 318 (8th Cir. 1945) ; United States v. Gundel-
finger, 98 F. Supp. 630 (W.D. Pa. 1951).
46. See, e.g., People v. Burson, 11 Il. 2d 360, 143 N.E.2d 239 (1957).
47. See, e.g., People v. Berling, 115 Cal. App. 2d 255, 251 P.2d 1017 (1953).
48. See, e.g., Carter v. State, 198 Miss. 523, 21 So. 2d 404 (1945).
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are incapable of properly defending themselves.4" Whether this principle
will be extended to embrace an amnesic defendant is unsettled.50
The less rigid approach is illustrated by the British case of R. v.
Podola,1 and the United States District Court case of United States
v. Sermon52 as well as by the present McClendon case. In Podola, the
defendant, indicted for the murder of a police officer, alleged lack of
capacity to plead to the indictment or to stand trial due to his loss of
memory (allegedly resulting from hysterical amnesia) of all events
prior to July 17, 1959 (the alleged murder having taken place on
July 13). Noting that this plea was novel,5" the trial judge left the
issue of the genuineness of -the amnesia to the jury -as a preliminary
issue, the burden of proof being on the defendant "'by the balance of
probabilities." The jury found that the defendant was not suffering
genuine loss of memory. He was tried for murder under a plea of
"not guilty" and convicted. The case was referred to the Court of
Criminal Appeals, which held that an amnesic defendant otherwise
normal did not fall within the Criminal Lunatics Act of 1800 and
thus could not argue .his amnesia in bar of trial. However, in doing
so, the court adopted the opinion of the High Court of Justiciary of
Scotland in Russell v. H.M. Advocate.5 4 In that case, the defendant,
at her arraignment on charge of embezzlement, raised hysterical am-
nesia covering the period of the crime in bar of trial. The court rejected
this plea. The Appellate Court affirmed, but observed:
... [L]oss of memory may be an important element in lead-
ing to conclusion that a panel [defendant] is insane . . . But if
it falls short of that, loss of memory in a person otherwise normal
and sane plays its full part, if sufficiently proved, in increasing the
onus ['burden of proof] on the Crown, and -in raising doubts to
which it may be the duty of a jury to give effect in a verdict of
acquittal after investigation of the whole case . . .5
United States v. Sermon5 6 illustrates a similarly thoughtful ap-
proach. In that case, the defendant was indicted for income tax fraud.
Alleging inability to understand the proceeding against him or properly
assist in his own defense, the defendant moved for a mental examination
under 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1959). The examination revealed that the
49. See Youtsey v. United States, 97 Fed. 937 (6th Cir. 1899) (where "impaired
mind and memory" is shown, the trial judge should adopt some method of satisfying
himself that the accused is able to rationally defend himself).
50. See Youtsey v. United States, 97 Fed. 937 (6th Cir. 1899).
51. [1959] 3 All E.R. 418, noted, CAMB. L.J. 5 (1960) ; 76 L.Q. Rzv. 2 (1960)
76 ScoT. L. Riv. 1 (1960).
52. 228 F. Supp. 972 (W.D. Mo. 1964).
53. The claim that a man cannot be tried for a crime if he does not remember
what happened is so novel that however you [the jury] answer the question which
has been placed before you [Is the defendant suffering from a genuine loss of
memory] the name of Guenther Podola [the defendant] is assured of a secure
place in the legal history of this country.
[1959] 3 All E.R. 418, 425.
54. 1946 S.C.(J.) 37, (1946) S.L.T. 93.
55. 1946 S.C.(J.) 37, (1946) S.L.T. 93, 98.
56. 228 F. Supp. 972 (W.D. Mo. 1964).
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defendant suffered, among other things, from cerebral arteriosclerosis,
as a result of which 'his remote memory was spotty and his recent
memory defective. Following this report, the court ordered that pro-
ceedings be held in camera for the presentation of factual data on which
the court could judge the extent of the disability imposed on the defen-
dant by his defective memory. The court adopted the principle that
"one cannot properly assist in his own defense unless he can advise
his counsel concerning the facts of the case as known to him and
unless, if necessary, he can testify on his own behalf in the cause con-
cerning those facts." 7 Determining from medical testimony that there
was no objective way of ascertaining what the defendant remembered
and what he did not, the court embarked on a study of how much of the
facts of the case were indeed known to the defendant and his counsel.
The court, finding that the defendant had in fact communicated to his
counsel all facts known to him and could testify in his own behalf,
held him competent to stand trial, without foreclosing his right to
raise -both past and present insanity as matters for jury determination.
Throughout .the opinion there were strong indications that had the
deefndant suffered total amnesia, he would have been held incompe-
tent.5" The importance of the Sermon case lies in the approach it illus-
trates and its implication of a requirement of close pre-trial co-operation
between lawyers and the court to assure that in each individual instance
justice is done.
In addition, it has been successfully argued that an amnesic defendant
is deprived of his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel
where there is a reasonable likelihood of recovery. 9 The right to
counsel is guaranteed by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment,6° and being "fundamental and essential to a fair trial,"
it is obligatory upon the states.6  Although the Supreme Court has
not yet completely specified elements of the right, considering the high
judicial regard currently shown the right to counsel, .i.t is possible
that the Court would hold that an amnesic defendant is deprived of
assistance of counsel if there is any possibility of his regaining his
memory. 2
57. Id. at 977.
58. E.g., "And certainly no one in the 1960's would dream of putting a defendant
suffering from established amnesia to trial for a crime of any sort." Id. at 976.
59. In addition to McClendon, see Cornell v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d 99, 338
P.2d 447 (1959). In Cornell, the amnesic defendant, arguing that his amnesia deprived
him of the right to assistance of counsel, sought mandamus to compel the trial court
to permit him to be examined by a hypnotist, who would try to induce memory recall.
In granting the mandamus, the California Supreme Court noted that:
[The right to counsel] includes the right of the accused to consult with his
counsel before trial in order that the accused and his attorney may present a
proper defense. . . .Without such a privilege, the constitutional right to counsel
would be a sham. If the attorney is not given a reasonable opportunity to ascertain
the facts surrounding the charged crime so he can prepare a proper defense, the
accused's basic right to effective representation would be denied.
52 Cal. 2d 99, 338 P.2d 447, 449 (1959).
60. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
61. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
62. It could also be argued that an amnesic defendant by virtue of his condition
is deprived of his sixth amendment right to confront the witnesses against him, a right
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The Pennsylvania court in Cummins v. Price has taken an tin-
necessarily doctrinaire approach in categorically stating that an amnesic
defendant is required to stand trial under common law and statutory
tests of capacity. The Arizona court, on the other hand, perhaps because
the defendant asked for more limited relief, has recognized -that ap-
propriate relief may be granted to an amnesic criminal defendant with-
out compromising the interest of the state in the orderly operation of
the criminal adjudicative process. A mechanical approach to the prob-
lem is outmoded in light of improved medical methods of detecting
and treating amnesia. The possibility of recovery distinguishes the case
of a defendant suffering from temporary amnesia from ,that of a de-
fendant who was insane at the time of the crime. The mere granting of
a continuance until such time as the defendant -regains his memory
does not result in a negation of his potential criminal responsibility.
Furthermore, since insanity, if proven, does negate criminal responsi-
bility, the insane defendant's assistance in the preparation of his defense
is far less crucial than that of an amnesic defendant, whose assistance
may be decisive in establishing his innocence. Thus, even where the
defendant's amnesia is permanent, a narrow approach ,is unjustified.
The courts are vested with a broad discretion in determining capacity
to stand trial,6 3 a discretion enhanced by a dearth of controlling prece-
dents.64 Pre-trial conference and discovery devices could be employed
on behalf of the defendant to ascertain the extent of the problem posed
by his disability and perhaps to mitigate against it. 6' The ill effects of
made obligatory upon the states in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). In Pointer,
Justice Black, speaking for the majority, stated that:
It cannot seriously be doubted at this late date that the right of cross-exami-
nation is included in the right of an accused in a criminal case to confront the
witnesses against him. And probably no one, certainly no one experienced in the
trial of lawsuits, would deny the value of cross-examination in exposing false-
hood and bringing out the truth in the trial of a criminal case.
Id. at 404. One might well ask how effective a cross-examination could be conducted
by an accused who himself is without recollection of the events surrounding his
alleged crime.
63. Perkins v. State, 217 Ark. 252, 230 S.W.2d 1 (1950); State v. Henke, 196
Wash. 185, 82 P.2d 544 (1938). See generally Judicial Hearings to Determine Mental
Competency, 39 F.R.D. 537 (1965).
64. See note 53 supra; State v. Severns, 184 Kan. 213, 336 P.2d 447, 453 (1959).
65. See United States v. Wilson, 263 F. Supp. 528, 534 (D.D.C. 1966) ; United
States v. Sermon, supra note 56; Comment, Amnesia: A Case Study in the Limits of
Particular Justice, 71 YALn L.J. 109, 132-36 (1961). Such pre-trial procedures should
be conducted in such a manner as to uphold the defendant's privilege against self-
incrimination. Cf. State v. Muline, 183 A.2d 831, 833 (Del. 1962). A self-incrimina-
tion problem could arise in any mental examination of an amnesic defendant. Arguably,
statements made in the course of his examination by a defendant whose sanity is at
issue are not testimonial in character, having significance only as symptomatic of
mental illness. The focus of an examination of an amnesic defendant, on the other
hand, is of necessity on his knowledge of facts surrounding the alleged crime. There
is, therefore, a greater danger in the case of an amnesic defendant that testamentary
matter could be elicited from him on the occasion of his mental examination. Cf.
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (dictum). On the other side, it could
be argued that by pleading amnesia in bar of trial, a defendant waives his privilege, or
that the privilege has no application in proceedings to determine present capacity to
stand trial, a purely collateral issue. See Hunt v. State, 248 Ala. 217, 27 So. 2d 186,
191 (1946) (dictum). In the federal courts, this problem does not arise as to the issue
of guilt, due to specific statutory prohibition against admitting any statement made by
an accused during a mental examination into evidence against him on the issue of his
guilt or innocence. 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1959).
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his disability could be circumscribed by appropriate instructions to the
jury. The possibilities are at 'hand whereby the courts can presently
offer "... sorely needed protection for law-abiding citizens" 60 and
also provide even the defendant 'who cannot -remember with a meaning-
ful day in court."'
66. Cummins v. Price, 421 Pa. 396, 218 A.2d 758, 763 (1966).
67. See generally Comment, Amnesia: A Case Study in the Limits of Particular
Justice, 71 YALE L.J. 109 (1961) ; Slough & Wilson, Mental Capacity to Stand Trial,
21 U. PITT. L. Rsv. 593 (1960).
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